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ABSTRACT
This paper presents a new data set on the diffusion of about 115 technologies in over 150 countries
over the last 200 years. We use this comprehensive data set to uncover general patterns of technology
diffusion.  Our  main  5  findings  are  as  follows:  (i)  Once  the  intensive  margin  is  measured,
technologies do not diffuse in a logistic way. (ii) Within a typical technology, the dispersion in the
adoption levels across countries is about 5 times larger than the cross-country dispersion in income
per capita. (iii) The rankings of countries by level of technology adoption are very highly correlated
across technologies. (iv) Within a typical technology, there has been convergence at an average rate
of 4 percent per year. (v) The speed of convergence for technologies developed since 1925 has been
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Technology plays a central role in macroeconomics and in economic development. Real business cycle 
theory places technology at the root of economic fluctuations (Kydland and Prescott [1982]). Growth 
theory has long postulated that improvements in technology are the source of long-run growth (Solow 
[1956], Romer [1990] and Aghion and Howitt [1992]) and that differences in technology are the main 
determinant of income per capita differences across countries (Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare [1997] and 
Hsieh and Klenow [2003]).  
To test these and other assertions of macro theory it is quite important to have direct measures of 
technology; however, current measures of technology are not completely satisfactory.  
The Solow residual, the most commonly applied measure of technology, has been criticized 
because, in addition to technology, it also captures the variation in capacity utilization (Basu [1995]), 
labor hoarding (Burnside et al. [1995]), and the inefficiencies of the economy (Weil [2005] ch.10).  
A more direct way of measuring technology involves measuring the share of potential adopters that 
have adopted a given technology at a point in time (Griliches [1957], Mansfield [1961], Gort and 
Klepper [1982], and Skinner and Staiger [2005]). This approach has two drawbacks. First, while this 
measure captures the extensive margin of technology adoption, it neglects the intensive margin (i.e. 
how intensively each potential adopter uses the technology). Second, it is complicated to measure the 
number of potential adopters. As a result, the diffusion of only a limited number of technologies can be 
documented using such measures.  
This paper has two goals. First, it presents a new data set on direct measures of technology 
adoption. Since technology is often embodied in capital goods, many of our measures correspond to 
the number of specific capital goods per capita. We measure computers and telephones in this way. 
Other technologies take the form of new production techniques. In these cases we can measure the 
diffusion of the technology either by the share of output produced with the technique (i.e. share of steel - 3 - 
produced with blast oxygen furnaces) or directly by the technique’s level of diffusion (i.e. number of 
credit and debit card transactions or cheques issued, both on per capita basis).  
Our Cross-Country Historical Adoption of Technology (CHAT) data set covers the diffusion of 
about 115 technologies in over 150 countries during the last 200 years. These technologies cover most 
sectors of economic activity.  
Since we measure technology directly, our measures are not subject to the type of criticisms raised 
against the Solow residual. Furthermore, as in Comin and Hobijn [2004], our measures of technology 
capture both the extensive and the intensive margins of diffusion.  
Besides presenting the data set, the second goal of this paper is to uncover general characteristics of 
technology adoption patterns both across countries and over time. We start this search by providing a 
number of illustrative examples taken from the CHAT data set. However, because of the large number 
of technologies and countries in the dataset, merely presenting the data does not allow us to extract 
common patterns more formally. We overcome this complication by using simple summary statistics to 
document a set of general patterns in the international diffusion of technology.  
Five facts emerge from this exploration.  
First, once the intensive margin is taken into account, the evolution of the level of the technology in 
the country does not typically follow an S-shaped pattern.    
Second, the cross-country dispersion of the level of technology is much larger than the dispersion 
of income per capita. On average, the dispersion of technology per capita is between 3 and 5 times 
larger than the dispersion of income per capita, and for 68 percent of the technologies the cross-
country dispersion of the technology level is larger than the dispersion of income per capita.  
Third, there are universal leaders and universal followers in technology among the countries in the 
world. That is, the rankings of countries according to the technology adoption level in a given year are - 4 - 
highly correlated across technologies.  The median correlation is 0.78. Among OECD countries, the 
universality of technological leadership is weaker. The median correlation of country rankings across 
technologies within the OECD is 0.54.   
Fourth, there is absolute convergence in 91 percent of the technologies of our CHAT data set. The 
average speed of convergence is 3.7 percent per year. Thus, half of the distance to the steady state is 
covered in 19 years.  
Fifth, the speed of convergence of technology across countries has accelerated over time. The 
median speed of convergence for technologies invented before 1925 has been about 2 percent per year. 
The median speed of convergence for technologies invented between 1925 and 1950 has been 5.5 
percent per year, and, for the technologies invented since 1950, the median speed of convergence has 
been about 6 percent per year.  
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The next section discusses the various conceptual and 
practical issues of measuring technology. Section 2 presents the illustrative examples of several 
diffusion curves that we use to point out the general patterns documented in the subsequent sections. 
Section 3 explores the shape of diffusion curves for each country-technology pair and shows that S-
shaped diffusion is only applicable for a limited set of technologies. Section 4 studies the cross-country 
dispersion of technology levels and compares it to the cross-country dispersion of income per capita. 
Section 5 examines the rankings of countries by level of adoption to see whether some countries tend 
to lead in all technologies or lead in some and trail in others. Section 6 looks at the cross-country 
convergence of technology and the evolution of the speed of convergence over time. Section 7 
concludes. - 5 - 
1. Measurement 
According to the Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary, technology is  
“a manner of accomplishing a task especially using technical processes, methods, or knowledge” 
Next we discuss various conceptual and practical issues that arise when attempting to measure 
technology levels. 
1.a Conceptual issues 
One approach to measuring technology diffusion, used in Griliches [1957] and Mansfield [1961], 
assumes that the adoption of technologies is a binary decision; producers or consumers can either 
adopt a technology or not adopt it. The ratio of the number of users of the technology to the number 
of potential users measures this extensive margin.   
For some technologies, however, the intensive margin may be as relevant as the extensive. For 
example, in transportation technologies, the improvement in productivity is proportional to the 
frequency of use, not to whether the technology is used at all; for computers and cars it is not 
unreasonable to think that, in the long run, each potential adopter may adopt more than one unit of the 
good. Similarly, technological change in cotton spinning has been directed toward increasing the 
number of spindles that each worker can operate simultaneously.  Thus, we consider it necessary to 
incorporate the intensive margin into measurement of technology diffusion. By doing that, we may be 
studying a different phenomenon than what the diffusion literature has previously explored, and some 
new terminology might be necessary. Conversely, one may think that technologies also diffuse along the 
intensive margin and employing the traditional terminology to refer to more comprehensive measures 
of the adoption of technologies may be appropriate. This latter opinion is our view on the matter, and, - 6 - 
in the rest of the paper, we continue to talk about technology diffusion as encompassing both the 
intensive and the extensive margins. 
To capture the intensive margin, we use measures of technology for which the numerator depends 
on the intensity with which each producer or consumer adopts the technology. For example, the 
diffusion of credit and debit cards is measured by the number of credit and debit card transactions per 
capita or by the number of points of service per capita, instead of by the share of people that has at 
least one credit card. This latter measure would capture only the extensive margin.  
A second important issue concerns the heterogeneity of units in our multiple measures of 
technology. We remove units from our measures either by taking logs (i.e. log of number of MRI units 
per capita) or by looking at shares (i.e. share of farmland that uses high yield varieties).  
The problem of units, however, does not fully address the larger question of how to measure 
technology, which can enter the economy in many forms and often cannot be separated from other 
inputs to production.  Many new technologies are embodied in new capital. Their degree of adoption is 
therefore proportional to the amount of the existent capital in which they are embodied. Thus, it can be 
difficult to determine if cross-country differences in these technologies are due to cross-country 
variation in aggregate capital per capita or in the degree of adoption of technologies. We answer this 
question by comparing the cross-country dispersion in our measures of embodied technology to the 
cross-country dispersion in aggregate capital per capita. The differential in the dispersion of embodied 
technologies over the dispersion in aggregate capital per capita is due to the dispersion in technology.  
One of the well-known Kaldor facts is that the capital-output ratio is roughly constant across 
countries. This implies that the cross-country dispersion in aggregate capital per capita is similar to the 
cross-country dispersion in income per capita. Based on this, we take the dispersion in income per 
capita as the benchmark for the embodied measures of technologies. - 7 - 
Not all of our technologies are measured with capital per capita; some are measured by the capital 
or output share associated to a new technology. These measures capture the diffusion of a particular 
production process or technique. Since the diffusion of these technologies typically involves capital 
substitution, it should not lead to capital deepening. The share of spindles that are ring or the share of 
steel produced with open hearth furnaces should thus be immune to variation in capital per worker. For 
these technological measures, the observed cross-country variation reflect only cross-country 
differences in technology.  
Another potentially interesting distinction is between technologies exclusively used for production 
and those also used by consumers. It may be argued that the latter are less interesting because home 
production output and consumer’s utility are left largely outside national accounting. Many technologies 
described as consumer technologies, however, including cell phones and cars, are important in the 
production of some services. In addition, since we have only about 13 technologies that are used 
primarily by consumers in our data set, the effect of their inclusion in our analysis will be small.  
Finally, after analyzing each individual technology, we need to aggregate the results. One way to 
aggregate over technologies is to use the GDP share of each technology’s sector. However, this 
approach presents two problems. First, we do not have a time series on sectoral shares for all countries 
in the data set. Second, these weights will depend on the level of aggregation used when assigning 
technologies to sectors. To avoid these complications, we restrict our analysis to technologies that have 
a significant effect in the sector and report both means and medians of the distribution of statistics by 
technology. 
1.b Practical issues 
To make cross-country and time-series comparisons of the level of technology, the objects measured 
must be as homogenous as possible. We try to mitigate this problem by measuring precisely defined - 8 - 
technologies. In some cases, such as credit and debit card transactions or tons of steel produced with 
Bessemer furnaces, the measure of technology is relatively homogenous both over time and across 
countries. In others, such as cars, there are important differences in the quality of the object measured 
over time and across countries. One factor that moderates in part the differences in quality is the 
positive correlation between demand and the quality of a technology. As a result, our quantity measures 
of technology partially reflect the cross-country and time-series variation in the quality of technologies.  
In order to be useful for inferring general patterns of technology diffusion, the data set must be 
comprehensive in at least three dimensions. First, it must contain information on technologies that 
span the most relevant sectors of economic activity. Second, it is important that the list of technologies 
covers production activities within sectors densely. Given the micro nature of our technologies, 
individual technologies may not be representative of the technological state of the sector; we have thus 
included multiple measures of technology for each sector. Third, the data set must cover both advanced 
and developing countries in significant numbers. This diversity overcomes the sample selection bias 
that may arise when focusing on a sample of developed countries (DeLong [1988]).  
The final practical concern is that the measures of technology sought must be easy to find. One of 
the main drawbacks of the traditional measures of the diffusion literature is that, in the last 50 years, 
researchers have been able to document the diffusion of a relatively small number of technologies in a 
few countries; measuring the number of producers that use a particular technology or the number of 
producers that potentially could requires micro-level data that is difficult to find. It is therefore 
important that we are able to compute our measures of diffusion using aggregate national data instead 
of information at the plant or producer level.  - 9 - 
1.c The CHAT Data Set 
The Cross-Country Historical Adoption of Technology data set is an unbalanced panel with 
information on the diffusion of about 115 technologies in over 150 countries during the last 200 years. 
Table A1 (in the appendix) describes for each country the number of technologies for which we have 
data that span at least three five-year periods. The average number of technologies per country is about 
34, while the median is 28. Table 1 describes the geographic distribution of the countries in our sample 
and the distribution of the number of technologies (that span at least three consecutive five-year 
periods) for countries in each continent. One interesting feature of the data set is that even in 
continents that have predominantly low income countries, such as Africa, the number of technologies 
in the typical country is fairly large. In this respect, the CHAT data set improves on previous data sets 
on technology diffusion, including the HCCTAD, which was presented in Comin and Hobijn [2004] 
and covered the diffusion of 25 technologies in 23 developed economies.  
In addition to covering the countries in the world evenly, a comprehensive data set on technology 
diffusion must also represent the various sectors in the economy. Table 2 describes the number of 
technologies covered by the CHAT data set in each of 8 major sectors in which the technologies are 
primarily used. These are agriculture, finance, health, steel, telecommunications, textiles, tourism, and 
transportation. Three of our technologies, namely electricity production, the number of computers, and 
the number of internet users, are used across the economy. They represent general purpose 
technologies and thus defy categorization by sector; we place them in a separate group.   
The first observation from Table 2 is that the data set covers eight sectors that represent a majority 
of GDP in most of the countries. In the U.S., for example, the sectors covered by the data set 
represented approximately 55 percent of the value added in the private sector in 2000. - 10 - 
In addition, the data set covers a substantial number of technologies in each of the sectors. These 
range from 2 technologies in tourism to 49 in health. Along this dimension, the CHAT data set also 
constitutes a substantial improvement over the HCCTAD, which does not contain information on the 
technologies in agriculture, finance, health, and tourism and has only 25 technologies, instead of about 
115.  
2. Illustrative examples 
Before exploring the general patterns of technology diffusion, it is useful to consider some specific 
examples. This will enable us to illustrate the general patterns uncovered in the sections that follow. 
One of the main conclusions from the empirical literature on technology diffusion has been that S-
shaped curves, such as the logistic, provide a good approximation to the diffusion of technologies. In 
Figure 1 we present one technology, the share of modern varieties in the total area cultivated, that 
diffuses approximately in an S-shaped manner. It reflects the extensive margin with which modern 
variety agricultural technologies are used. 
However, for technologies for which the intensive margin is more relevant, S-shaped curves do not 
appear to provide a good fit for diffusion patterns. This is the case, for example, in Figures 2 and 3, 
which cover the diffusion of planes and cars, respectively. More specifically, Figure 2 plots the (log of 
the) passenger-kilometers traveled by plane per capita, while Figure 3 plots the (log of) cars per capita.  
Another a striking feature of these figures is the large cross-country dispersion present in diffusion. 
The number of per capita aviation passenger-kilometers traveled in the U.S. in 1960 was 400 times 
larger than in China and almost 150 times larger than in India in the same year. The number of cars per 
capita in the U.S. in 1960 was 400 times larger than in India and, as late as 2000, it was about 50 times 
larger than in China or India. These disparities are very big when compared to the large gap in income - 11 - 
per capita between the U.S. and China and India (a factor of about 20). Moreover, they do not reflect 
the quality differential between cars in the U.S. and cars in China or India. 
The large disparity in technology diffusion across countries is ubiquitous across sectors. Figure 4 
illustrates this point with the (log of) kilowatts of electricity produced per capita. 
A complementary way to address this issue is to measure how many years it took country B to 
reach the level country A had in year Y. Answering this question is only possible with a long time series. 
Data this extensive is often not available. For the case of telephones, however, we have sufficient data 
to measure the cross-country technological distance in time. As illustrated in Figure 5, the distances are 
fairly large and vary substantially across countries. For example, the level of phones per capita in the 
U.S. had in 1910 was reached by France 45 years later, by South Africa 55 years later, by Brazil 65 years 
later, by China more than 80 years later, and by India 90 years later; Tanzania still has fewer phones per 
capita than the U.S. in 1910. 
Interestingly, this enormous dispersion in technology diffusion is also present within advanced 
economies. Figures 6, 7 and 8 display the diffusion of technologies in the service sector. Figures 6 and 7 
depict the diffusion of magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) and computer-assisted tomography (CAT) 
scanners, respectively, by looking at the log of units per capita. Figure 8 covers the diffusion of a 
technology in the financial sector, namely the log of the number of credit and debit card payments per 
capita. 
The multidimensional nature of technology implies that for the large cross-country differences in 
technology adoption to lead to large cross-country differences in the overall technological level, the 
relative position of countries in technology adoption must be highly correlated across technologies. In 
other words, there must be universal technology leaders and universal followers across technologies. 
Figures 2 through 5 support the consistency in technological leadership from a worldwide perspective. - 12 - 
Figures 6 through 8 demonstrate that, within the OECD, country rankings in technology adoption are 
less correlated across technologies.  
After studying the distribution of technology adoption levels in the cross-section, it is interesting to 
explore its dynamics. In particular, we can investigate whether the differences in the speed of 
technology adoption across countries decline over time. Figure 9 presents the diffusion of cell phones. 
The gap between the U.S. and China in the number of cell phones per capita has reduced from a factor 
of about 1100 in 1990 to about 7 in 2000. This convergence in the technology adoption levels is also 
evident in most of the other technologies whose diffusion curves we have presented so far. 
Because of the multidimensional nature of technology, however, we can look for a new notion of 
convergence that does not arise in one-dimensional variables such as income per capita. We can 
examine whether the speed with which followers catch up to the technological leaders has accelerated 
for recent technologies relative to technologies that were invented earlier. Figures 10 and 11 represent 
the diffusion of computers and the internet, respectively. The diffusion of these technologies in the 
U.S. in 1990 was, respectively, 490 and 13,000 times more extensive than in China, while in 2000 the 
gap was reduced by a factor of 14 for computers and to a factor of 480 for the internet. In earlier 
technologies, such as automobiles or electricity, the diffusion of these technologies in the U.S. in 1990 
was 20 and 400 times more extensive than in China. By 2000, this gap was reduced by a factor of 7 and 
8, respectively. These illustrative examples suggest that the convergence within newer technologies is 
faster than within older technologies. 
Next, we go beyond these illustrative examples to show that the basic observations presented in this 
section constitute robust facts about the general diffusion patterns of the CHAT data set. - 13 - 
3. Diffusion Curves are not Logistic 
At least since Griliches [1957], economists have acknowledged the good approximation that S-shaped 
curves, such as the logistic, provide to the process of technology diffusion as measured by the extensive 
margin. The logistic curve is defined by 
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where t represents time, in our case measured in years, δ3 reflects the speed of adoption, δ2 is a constant 
of integration that positions the curve on the time scale, and δ1 is the long-run outcome, i.e. the limit of 
Yt for t going to infinity.  
Several features of this curve are relevant. First of all, it asymptotes to 0 when t goes to minus 
infinity and to δ1 when t goes to infinity. Secondly, it is symmetric around the inflection point of 
Yt=0.5δ1 which occurs at t=-δ2/δ3. Finally, the one percent diffusion point (i.e. the time in which 
Yt=0.01δ1) is given by t=(-ln(0.99)-δ2)/δ3. On account of its good fit when the extensive margin of 
adoption is measured, the logistic has often been used to reduce the process of technology diffusion to 
the three parameters that define it, namely δ1, δ2, and δ3. 
The first question that we investigate is whether this approximation of a country’s technology 
diffusion still provides a reasonable approximation once the measure of technology diffusion 
incorporates the intensive margin. To answer this question we fit a logistic curve to each of the 5700 
technology-country pairs and explore the implications of the estimates. Specifically, let Yijt be the level 
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We first find that, for 23 percent of the technology-country combinations, it is not possible to fit 
logistic to the diffusion curves, likely because of the data’s lack of curvature. When the diffusion line 
does not have sufficient curvature, the log-likelihood function is flat for many parameter 
configurations, and it is therefore not possible to determine the parameter configuration that maximizes 
the log-likelihood function. In these circumstances, we cannot identify the parameters that govern the 
curvature of the logistic. We take this as an indication that the logistic provides a poor approximation 
to the diffusion of technology i in country j.  
When the estimation converges, the R
2 tends to be very high. In particular, conditional on obtaining 
an estimate, the R
2 is above .90 for 92 percent of the technology-country pairs.  
The R
2 is not a good measure of fit for logistic curves. It is well known that, since both the fitted 
logistic curves and the data contain trends, the high R
2s reflect the fit of this trend and not of the 
fluctuations around it. Therefore, for a better sense of the appropriateness of the logistic 
approximation, we have to go beyond the R
2. 
In particular, we explore how the data conforms to three properties of the logistic. First, logistic 
curves increase monotonically from the introduction of the technology to a ceiling. This implies that 
the estimate of δ3ij should be positive. This is the case for a majority of technology-country pairs, but a 
substantial number of pairs (929 out of 4381) have a negative estimate of δ3ij. In some instances, such as 
open hearth steel production or the number of mule spindles, the negative estimate of δ3ij results from 
the partial or complete replacement of the technology by a better technology. The replacement of a 
dominated technology may, of course, be consistent with a logistic diffusion.  
In other cases, however, the negative estimate of δ3ij does not result from the replacement of the 
technology but simply from the fact that the use of technology is growing at a lower rate than the - 15 - 
population. The example of cars in Tanzania illustrated in Figure 3 provides a good example of this 
phenomenon.  These cases contradict the hypothesis of logistic diffusion. 
In order to precisely identify cases that violate this property of logistic diffusion, we would have to 
examine each of the 929 pairs individually.  This would involve an, in large part, arbitrary classification 
of our results. However, we can make a conservative estimate of the number of technology-country 
pairs for which the negative estimate of δ3ij does not result from the substitution by a superior 
technology. Since the relative productivity of two competing technologies is likely to be similar across 
countries, the introduction of a superior technology will likely induce the eventual replacement of the 
original technology in all countries and will thus produce negative estimates of δ3ij for a majority of 
countries. Therefore, we can use the fraction of negative estimates of δ3ij to guide our judgments.    
For  17 out of 116 technologies in CHAT, at least 50 percent of the countries have negative 
estimates for δ3ij. As expected, the technologies include measures such as open hearth and Bessemer 
steel production and the number of sail ships, hospital beds, and cheques, all of which have been 
recently dominated by another technology. In addition, only a few technologies with a high prevalence 
of countries with negative estimates of δ3ij., such as pesticide usage and the number of varicose vein 
correction procedures, clearly have no superior technology. Meanwhile, the list of technologies that do 
not have a majority of negative estimates of δ3ij includes a few technologies, such as the number of 
telegrams sent, that have been dominated in some countries. Using the 50 percent cutoff as a general 
guide for selecting non-dominated technologies, we find that 462 of the 929 technology-country pairs 
with a negative estimate of δ3ij violate one of the assumptions of logistic diffusion by not increasing 
monotonically to a ceiling (Table 3, row 4).
1 
                                                 
1 From this point forward, we consider only technologies with positive curvature parameters. - 16 - 
Next, we explore the predicted initial adoption dates to  detect further issues with the logistic 
approach. To determine predicted initial adoption dates, we use our estimates of equation (2) to find 
the predicted time at which 1 percent of the estimated ceiling adoption level was reached. Then, we 
compare these to each technology’s invention date. Figures 12 and 13 plot these predicted adoption 
dates and actual invention dates for every technology-country pair
2. Figure 13 zooms in Figure 12 and 
only shows the technologies invented during the last 200 years.  
Two types of red flags emerge from these figures. For 210 of the technology-country pairs for 
which we have a positive estimate of the slope, the predicted initial date of diffusion is prior to the 
invention date of the technology. For some technologies for which we do not have an invention date, 
such as hospital beds or irrigation, it is harder to determine precisely when a predicted initial adoption 
date is too early to be reasonable. Even after taking this fact into consideration, however, the estimated 
initial adoption dates are still implausibly early for some countries. Taking a conservative invention date 
of 1000BC, we find an additional 14 technology-country pairs with implausibly early predicted adoption 
dates.  
These implausible estimates reflect the fact that the diffusion of the technology does not follow a 
logistic pattern in these countries. More precisely, it likely happens because the identified diffusion 
curves are concave.  When fitting a logistic to a curve that is concave, the steeper region of the curve 
will be fit near to inflexion point of the logistic, and, as a result, the predicted 1 percent adoption level 
will occur much earlier than the actual one. This can be seen in Figure 14, which presents the actual 
diffusion of televisions in Sweden (in solid) and the diffusion predicted by fitting a logistic (in dash).  
The opposite situation, an unrealistically late predicted initial adoption date, also suggests the failure 
of the logistic approximation. Technically, this may occur for two different reasons. First, the diffusion 
                                                 
2 For clarity we have not included in the plots the technologies already available in 1500. The invention date of these technologies is more 
difficult to establish. - 17 - 
data for the technology may be relatively flat initially with a slight acceleration at the end of the sample. 
The logistic interprets this acceleration as indication that the inflexion point has not yet been reached 
and places the predicted initial adoption date close to the first available observation; in some cases, the 
first observation in our data set may correspond to a date posterior to the invention. Figure 15 
illustrates this argument with the diffusion of cars in Taiwan. Second, the logistic may predict an 
unrealistically late initial adoption date if the first observation in sample is significantly later than the 
invention date and if the slope of the diffusion data’s curve is initially steep before flattening. As 
illustrated with the diffusion of newspapers in Germany in Figure 16, the logistic fits the first 
observation near to the inflexion point. Since the curve is initially very steep, the predicted initial 
adoption date is close to the first observation. In reality, however, diffusion has not occurred 
symmetrically, and it has taken many years to reach the level at which our sample starts. In addition, the 
initial level in sample is substantially higher than one percent of the “estimated ceiling”. As a result, the 
logistic predicts that the one percent adoption level is reached close to the beginning of sample, while, 
in reality, that level was reached long before.  
The identification of these cases is a bit arbitrary since, as we have seen in Figure 5, some countries 
tend to lag the technological leaders for as long as a century. Given that the existence of data for a 
technology implies that diffusion has begun, we assume that the 1 percent level must be reached soon 
after our initial observation. We will assume that the initial adoption date predicted by the logistic is 
unreasonably late if either it is at least 150 years after the invention date or at least 20 years after the 
first observation we have in sample for the pair.
3 We find 294 additional technology-country pairs are 
poorly approximated by the logistic in this respect (Table 3, row 5).  
                                                 
3 We omit the technologies without precise invention dates when identifying cases in which initial adoption falls more than 150 years after 
the invention date. - 18 - 
One final, critical property of S-shaped diffusion curves is that their convergence to a fixed ceiling. 
Once the intensive margin is included, this condition no longer necessarily holds. Indeed, based on the 
plots in Figures 2, 4, 5, 8, and 9, we can see that technological measures such as aviation passenger-
kilometers, electricity, telephones, credit and debit card payments, and cell phones violate this property. 
However, as with the share of negative estimates of δ3ij, it is not trivial to determine exactly how many 
of our technology-country pairs have a moving ceiling. However, it seems reasonable to attempt to 
identify technologies that clearly fit this profile. To the list above we can conservatively add steam and 
motor ship tonnage; rail passengers-kilometers; railway freight tonnage; tons of blast-oxygen furnace, 
electric-arc furnace, and stainless steel produced; cars; trucks; aviation freight ton-kilometers; TVs; PCs; 
credit and debit card points of service; ATMs; and cheques, all in per capita terms. The variable ceiling 
that characterizes a priori the diffusion of these technologies generates 1171 additional deviations from 
the logistic pattern (row 6 in Table 3). This brings the total number of technology-country pairs for 
which the diffusion is not well characterized by the logistic to 3507 out of the 5700 technology-country 
pairs in our sample. Hence, we conclude with the first finding of our analysis. 
Fact 1:  Once the intensive margin is included in the measure of technology diffusion, the S-shaped 
curves, and in particular the logistic, provide a poor description of the diffusion process. 
4. Cross-country Dispersion in Technology 
One important rationale for looking directly at technology is to assess the role of technological 
differences as a determinant of the cross-country dispersion in income per capita. If technology is an 
important driving force of differences in standards of living, observed cross-country disparities in 
technology must be large. To explore whether this is the case, for each technology and year, we - 19 - 
compute the dispersion of the technology levels across countries and compare it to the dispersion of 
income per capita for the same groups of countries. 
 This analysis requires that our dispersion statistics are unaffected by the units of the technology 
measures. We achieve this in two ways. First, we express the differences in technology adoption levels 
in log per capita terms, which do not depend on units of measurement; therefore, we measure their 
dispersion with the cross-country variance. For the technologies measured as shares, we compute 
dispersion with the coefficient of variation. Then we compare the cross-country dispersion of each 
technology with the cross-country dispersion of either the log of income per capita (for log per capita 
technologies) or income per capita (for shares) across the same set of countries. This results in one ratio 
of dispersion measure for each technology for each five-year period. We aggregate all this information 
across technologies both weighted by the length of our time series (measured by the number of five-
year periods for which we have data) and un-weighted.  
Table 4 reports the average ratio of cross-country dispersion of technology over the cross-country 
dispersion of income per capita. To have a better sense of the distribution of these ratios, Table 4 also 
reports the percentage of cases in which the cross-country dispersion in technology is larger than the 
cross-country dispersion in income per capita. 
  The main conclusion from this analysis  is that cross-country differences in the adoption of 
technologies are much larger than income per capita differences. The ratio of the variances is on 
average 5 when we weight technologies by the length of their time series and 3 when we do not weight. 
It is not merely a few outliers driving this large dispersion; for 76 percent of the technology-periods the 
cross-country dispersion in technology adoption is larger than the dispersion in income per capita. 
When giving equal weights to the technologies, we still find that the cross-country dispersion is larger 
than the dispersion in income per capita in 68 percent of the technologies.  - 20 - 
We do observe that the cross-country dispersion in the 13 consumer technologies in CHAT is 
larger than for the rest of log-per capita technologies. In particular, the un-weighted average of the ratio 
of the dispersion of consumer technologies to the dispersion in log income per capita is slightly below 
7; when weighted by the length of series, the ratio is 9.8.  
 
Finally, the cross-country dispersion of technology relative to income per capita seems to be smaller 
for technologies measured as shares than for technologies measured in log per capita terms. However, 
even in the former, cross-country dispersion in technology adoption is comparable to the cross-country 
dispersion in income per capita. 
Based on these facts, we summarize the main conclusion from our exploration of the cross-country 
variation in technology adoption and income.  
Fact 2:  The cross-country dispersion in technology adoption for individual technologies is 3 to 5 times 
larger than cross-country dispersion in income per capita. 
5. Universal Technology Leaders 
The multidimensional nature of technology makes it possible to understand the correlation of relative 
positions of countries across technologies. This is relevant for two reasons. First, given the large 
observed cross-country dispersion in individual technology adoption (Fact 2), a high correlation of 
rankings across technologies implies that there are big cross-country differences in aggregate 
technology levels. Second, as we shall see in the next section, the persistence of country rankings across 
technologies in the initial stages of adoption may have important consequences for the dynamics of the 
cross-country distribution of overall technology levels.  - 21 - 
One practical problem with considering a country’s percentile at a point in time stems from the way 
that relative position depends on the country coverage of the data set for that technology and period; 
variation in the country coverage may significantly distort the rankings of countries. We mitigate this 
potential problem in two ways. First, we conduct two separate analyses, one using only OECD 
countries and the other using only technologies that cover both OECD and non-OECD countries.. 
With this strategy, we lessen the effect of variation in the mix of rich and poor countries in the sample 
when assigning rankings. In addition, we also remove from our analysis the technology-periods for 
which we have very few countries in sample. This reduces the volatility of rankings of countries in the 
initial stages of diffusion when the data set includes only a few countries.
4  
To compute the correlations between country rankings in a technology and country rankings across 
technologies we proceed as follows: First, we assign each country (j) to a percentile for each technology 
(i) and 5-year period (t). Let’s denote this percentile by rijt. Then, we compute the average ranking across 












1  ,   (3) 
where Njt denotes the number of technologies for country j in period t. Finally, we compute the cross-
country correlation between the vector of rankings in the technology (rijt) and the vector of average 
country rankings across technologies (rjt) for year t. This generates a correlation for each technology and 
(5-year) time period. To aggregate this information we compute the average and median of these cross-
country correlations. These are reported in Table 5 both for the sub-sample of technologies that have 
an even coverage of the countries in the world and for the OECD sub-sample.  
                                                 
4 For OECD technologies we require at least 3 countries in sample to consider the correlation. For technologies that cover both OECD 
and non-OECD countries we require a minimum of 6 countries. - 22 - 
The correlations of rankings across technologies are fairly high. For the technologies that cover 
both OECD and non-OECD countries the average correlation is 67 percent, while the median is 
78 percent. When we restrict attention to the OECD, the correlations remain high but are significantly 
lower than when all the countries are included. Within the OECD sample, the average correlation of 
technology rankings is 45 percent, while the median is 54 percent. Therefore, we conclude that, from a 
global perspective, there are universal technological leaders and universal followers. 
Fact 3: The relative position of countries according to the degree of technology adoption is very highly 
correlated across technologies. This correlation declines significantly within the OECD. 
6. Convergence 
After exploring the properties of the cross-sectional distribution of technologies, we turn our attention 
to the dynamics of the distribution. More specifically, we address the issue of convergence in 
technology levels across countries. The convergence of income per capita levels across countries has 
attracted much attention (Baumol [1986], DeLong [1988], Mankiw et al. [1992], Barro and Sala-i-Martin 
[1992]).
5  Because technology is an important determinant of income per capita differences, the issue of 
technological convergence is of equal interest. 
One important difference from the literature on the convergence of income per capita stems from 
the multidimensional nature of technology. This introduces the distinction between convergence within 
a technology and convergence across technologies. That is, even if countries that start behind catch up 
with leaders within each technology, the overall technology level of less advanced countries may not be 
converging if less advanced countries similarly start behind in the new technologies. We proceed next 
to explore the convergence first within and then across technologies.  - 23 - 
6.a Within Technologies 
We follow the example of the convergence of income per capita literature and estimate both measures 
of absolute β-convergence and σ-convergence. We estimate the speed of β-convergence of technology i 
by running the following regression for technologies measured in log-per-capita terms: 
  t ij t ij t ij t ij u Y e Y Y
j
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−
−
β α  (4) 
while for technologies measured as shares we estimate β-convergence from: 
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β α    (5)   
Figures 17 and 18 display the distributions of β separately for the technologies measured in logs per 
capita and those measured as shares. Table 6 reports the mean and median speed of convergence for 
each type of technology. For both types of technologies combined, the average speed of convergence 
has been 3.8 percent per year, while the median has been 2.6 percent per year. We observe β-
convergence in 93 percent of the log-per-capita measures and 83 percent of the technologies measured 
as shares. The distributions of speeds of convergence are fairly similar for each type of measure. The 
average speed of convergence is slightly higher for log-per-capita than for share variables, but the way 
the technology adoption level is measured does not seem to be relevant when studying the convergence 
properties of technology. For the small subset of consumer technologies, meanwhile, the average speed 
of convergence is slightly smaller than for the overall group of log-per-capita technologies (2.7 vs. 4.1 
percent per year). 
The absolute convergence within technologies contrasts with the established lack of convergence in 
income per capita on the global level. Within the OECD, however, it is well established that income per 
capita levels converge.  The dichotomy in income per capita level convergence makes one wonder if the 
                                                                                                                                                                  
5 Furthermore, in principle, one can explore the convergence of any variable. Comin [1997] and Hobijn and Franses [2001], for example, 
explore whether there is convergence in alternative indicators of standards of living, like life expectancy and mortality. - 24 - 
within-technology convergence comes only from OECD countries converging to the technological 
leader. To answer this question we analyze the technologies for which we have data for both OECD 
and non-OECD countries. For these technologies we estimate the speed of convergence within the 
OECD and compare it to the speed of convergence worldwide. In Table 7 we observe that, for these 
technologies, the worldwide speed of convergence is on average 2.9 percent per year while within the 
OECD the average speed of convergence for these technologies is 1.9 percent per year. Hence, 
contrary to what we observe in income per capita, non-OECD countries converge to the adoption level 
of technological leaders faster than the technological laggards within the OECD. 
σ-convergence provides an alternative way to describe the evolution of the cross-country 
distribution of technology over time. We estimate the speed of σ-convergence in technology i, βσi,  by 
running the following regression:  
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jt is the cross-country standard deviation of technology j at year t. To avoid the bias produced 
by the gradual inclusion of countries to the sample, we make sure that every year the cross-country 
measures of technology used as left and right-hand-side variables in regression (3) are computed over 
the same sample of countries. Columns 4 through 6 of Table 6 report the mean and median speeds of 
σ-convergence. The average of the technology speeds of convergence estimated from equation (3) is 
7 percent per year, and the median speed of convergence is 4.1 percent per year. These estimates are 80 
and 60 percent higher than the estimates obtained from the β speeds of convergence regression (2). 
Qualitatively, the β and σ estimates of the speed of convergence within a technology are consistent. Not 
only is the fraction of convergent technologies similar (89 percent for β vs. 80 percent for σ), but also 
the β and σ-speeds of convergence are positively correlated across technologies (42 percent for the 109 
technologies for which β is smaller than .5).  - 25 - 
The disparity in the average speed of β and σ convergence may be an indication that the system that 
governs the dynamics of technology diffusion has multiple state variables. In this case, the dynamics of 
the system would not be well approximated by only the current state of the specific technology. Our 
goal here, however, is to provide a statistical description of the dynamics of technology diffusion and 
not to interpret these estimates in a structural way.  
Based on these results we reach the following conclusion. 
Fact 4:  There is convergence within technologies. The average speed of convergence is between 4 and 7 
percent per year. 
6.b Across Technologies 
The presence of cross-country convergence within technologies may not be sufficient to guarantee the 
convergence of overall technology levels. If new technologies arrive continuously and laggard countries 
tend to start behind in most new technologies, that effect will counterbalance the catch up that takes 
place within existing technologies. As a result, follower countries will not catch up in the overall 
technological level unless the speed of convergence within technologies accelerates over time. This 
situation is represented in Figures 19 and 20 in which we see the trajectories for a continuum of 
technologies in two countries (A, the leader, and B, the laggard). In Figure 19, the speed of convergence 
within each technology is constant, and, in this stationary world, the overall technological gap between 
A and B is also constant (see bottom panel). In Figure 20, the speed of diffusion of technologies in 
country B accelerates over time, which increases the speed of convergence within technologies and 
reduces the technological gap between A and B (see bottom panel).   
To consider which of these situations provides a better characterization of global technology 
diffusion, we order the technologies in the CHAT data set by their date of invention and explore how 
the speed of convergence has evolved over time. For the purposes of brevity, we only report the results - 26 - 
from this exercise using the β speed of convergence. The results for σ convergence are qualitatively very 
similar. Figure 21 presents the scatter plot of the speeds of convergence of our technologies and the 
evolution of the median speed of convergence for the technologies invented in each 25 year period. 
Table 8 reports the evolution of the average and median speed of convergence.  
The first striking observation is that there has been a significant increase in the speed of 
convergence for technologies developed after 1925.
6 The average speed of convergence for 
technologies developed before 1925 is 2.4 percent per year, and the median speed of convergence is 
2 percent. For the technologies developed after 1925 the mean and median speeds of convergence are, 
respectively,  6.7 and 5.9 percent per year. The average speed of convergence within technologies 
developed after 1925 has almost tripled in comparison to those developed before 1925. 
By looking at the evolution of the average and median speed of convergence within technologies, it 
is also evident that the increase in the speed of convergence of post-1925 technologies resembles more 
a structural break than a smooth transition.
7 The average speed of convergence of technologies 
developed in the period 1900-1925 is approximately 1.5 percent per year, while the average speeds of 
convergence for technologies developed in the periods 1925-1950 and 1950-1975 are 5.8 and 7.8 
percent per year, respectively.  
However, before concluding that cross-country technology levels have converged faster for new 
than for old technologies, we must determine whether the acceleration of the speed of convergence is 
uniform across technologies or whether it is driven by the technologies that cover only OECD 
countries. Figure 22 answers this question by plotting the evolution of the median speed of 
                                                 
6 Table A3 in the appendix details the speed of convergence for each technology together with the technology invention dates.  
7 The high average speed of convergence during the period 1850-1875 is driven entirely by acid Bessemer steel. If that 
technology is removed from the sample, the average speed of convergence for the technologies developed between 1850 
and 1875 becomes 2.6 percent per year. 
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convergence for each 25-year period separating the technologies that cover only OECD economies 
from the rest. The increase in the median speed of convergence is evident for both groups of 
technologies; therefore, this suggests that the increase in the speed of convergence is present across 
OECD and non-OECD countries. 
Thus, we conclude our analysis by stating the last finding. 
Fact 5: The cross-country speed of convergence within technologies developed after 1925 is about three 
times higher than for the technologies developed before 1925.  
A corollary of Fact 4 and Fact 5 is that there seems to be evidence of absolute convergence in the 
overall technology levels across countries. This finding may seem to be at odds with the observed lack 
of absolute convergence in income per capita. However, it is consistent with the evolution of existing 
aggregate measures of technology. In particular, we have estimated a standard convergence regression 
(with no controls) on the productivity residuals that emerge from the development accounting exercise 
conducted by Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare [1997]. Using this very different measure of aggregate 
technology we also estimate a rapid speed of convergence (7 percent per year).  
 7. Conclusion 
This paper has presented and begun to analyze a new data set that provides the most comprehensive 
coverage to date of technology diffusion over the last 200 years. Five facts emerge from this analysis. 
First, once the intensive margin is measured, technologies do not diffuse in a logistic way. Second, 
within a typical technology, the dispersion in the adoption levels across countries is about 5 times larger 
than the cross-country dispersion in income per capita. Third, there is a high correlation across 
technologies in the rankings of countries by technology adoption. Fourth, within a typical technology, 
there has been convergence at an average rate of 4 percent per year. Fifth, the speed of convergence for - 28 - 
technologies developed since 1925 has been almost three times higher than the speed of convergence 
for technologies developed before 1925.  
These facts are important in themselves. Our CHAT data set allows us to uncover direct evidence 
on relevant patterns in technology adoption that could not be explored using other data sets. In 
addition, these stylized facts provide guidance for the development of future theories on determinants 
of technology adoption.  
We leave for future research the search for correlates of our technology measures that should 
provide a second set of binding constraints in the effort to uncover the determinants of the large cross-
country differences in technology adoption. Candidate correlates are not only variables that have been 
suggested as determinants of income per capita, but also the intensity of other technologies that may 
complement or substitute the relevant technology. - 29 - 
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A. Underlying details 
This appendix contains more detailed information about the CHAT data set and about the estimated 
rates of convergence presented in the main text. Tables A1, A2 and Figure A1 provide detailed 
information about the coverage of the data that we use, while table A3 contains details about the 
estimated rates of convergence. 
Table A1 lists the number of technologies we have for each of the countries in the data set. In our 
analysis we have to deal both with country fragmentations and reunification processes. When a majority 
of the territory remains after the fragmentation or a majority of the unified territory corresponds to just 
one of the pre-unification countries we identify the unified country with the big part. In cases of 
country fragmentation, we have identified a successor country in cases where a large portion of the 
territory remains as a single country; in cases of unification, we have identified a precursor country in a 
similar manner.  Thus, Russia and the U.S.S.R have been treated as one national entity, as have 
Germany and West Germany. In cases where a country divides into or merges from a number of more 
equal pieces, we have chosen to treat the whole and the parts as different countries. Examples of this 
approach include Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, and Korea.  
Table A2 describes for each technology the number of countries, the type of economies, and the 
time period covered. 
Table A3 presents the annual speed of β-convergence for each technology together with its 
invention date. Technologies invented prior to 1500 are usually difficult to date precisely, and we list 
them as pre-1500 technologies. 
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of Technologies Per 
Country 
  Number of 
Countries 
Total 34.2  28.0  20.37    159 
Africa 24.9  26.0  9.00    48 
Asia 28.9  26.5  12.51    44 
Europe 49.3  41.5  28.23    38 
North America  34.0  27.5  22.64    12 
Oceania 43.3  44.0  21.09    4 
South America  40.0  44.0  20.94    13 
 
Table 2: Technology Sector Coverage 
  Technologies Per Sector 
Agriculture 8 
Finance 5 
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Table 3: Deviations from Logistic Diffusion 
    Number of Technology-Country Pairs    Cumulative Failure of Logistic
Total Country -Technology Pairs    5700     
Flatness of Likelihood Surface    1319    1319 
Negative Estimate of δ3 462    1781 
Too Early Predicted Adoption    224    2005 
Too Late Predicted Adoption    331    2336 
Growing Ceiling    1171    3507 
Table 4: Dispersion in Technology Adoption Relative to Dispersion in Income per Capita 
  Average Dispersion    Percentage of Instances with Ratios>1 
  Log Per Capita    Share  All  Log Per Capita    Share  All 
Weighted by # of 5-
Year Intervals  6.02   1.03  5.2  84    33  76 
Un-Weighted 3.68    0.95  3.17 75    42  68 
Table 5: Correlations Between Country Rankings in a Technology  
and Average Country Rankings across Technologies 
    Technologies Covering All Countries Technologies Covering OECD countries
Average Correlation    0.67  0.45 
Median Correlation    0.78  0.54 
Number of Technologies    51  115 
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Table 6: Speed of Convergence Within Technologies. 
   β-convergence  σ-convergence 
  
Log Per 
Capita Shares All 
Log Per 
Capita   Shares   All 
Average   0.041  0.027  0.038 0.071    0.068    0.07 
Median   0.03  0.015  0.026 0.043    0.019    0.041 
Number of 
technologies  89 23  112  91    24    115 
 
 
Table 7: Speed of Convergence Worldwide and Within the OECD. 
   β-convergence 
   All  Countries    OECD 
Average   0.029    0.019 
Median   0.02    0.01 
Note: Average and median speed of convergence over 55 technologies  
that cover both OECD and non-OECD countries - 35 - 
Table 8: Evolution of Speed of Convergence by Invention Date. 
Inverval Median  Mean 
Up to 1800  0.020  0.025 
   (0.015, 0.034) 
    
1801-1825 0.004  0.011 
   (-0.004, 0.026) 
    
1826-1850 0.020  0.018 
   (0.005, 0.03) 
    
1851-1875 0.025  0.061 
   (0.005, 0.118) 
    
1876-1900 0.030  0.024 
   (-0.005, 0.052) 
    
1901-1925 0.015  0.002 
   (-0.039, 0.042) 
    
1926-1950 0.055  0.055 
   (0.03, 0.079) 
    
1951-1975 0.087  0.087 
   (0.059, 0.115) 
    
1976-2000 0.037  0.038 
   (0.017, 0.06) 
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Table A1: Technologies Per Country 
Afghanistan 16    Egypt 43    Lebanon 39    Saudi  Arabia  34 
Albania 21    El Salvador  34    Lesotho 16    Senegal  28 
Algeria 44    Equatorial Guinea  9    Liberia  17    Serbia and Montenegro  18 
Angola 26    Eritrea 3    Libya 28    Sierra  Leone  21 
Argentina 48    Estonia 20    Lithuania 19    Singapore 27 
Armenia 14    Ethiopia 29    Luxembourg 10    Slovak  Republic  39 
Australia 68    Finland 95    Macedonia 16    Slovenia  22 
Austria 70    France 82    Madagascar 29    Somalia  20 
Azerbaijan 15    Gabon 20    Malawi 5    South  Africa  44 
Bangladesh 32    Gambia 18    Malaysia 37    South  Korea  44 
Belarus 16    Georgia 15    Mali 26    Spain  77 
Belgium 78    Germany 87    Mauritania 22    Sri  Lanka  37 
Belize 4    Ghana 36    Mauritius 26    Sudan  29 
Benin 26    Greece 61    Mexico 78    Suriname  4 
Bolivia 29    Guatemala 27    Moldova 21    Swaziland 17 
Bosnia-Herzegovina 17    Guinea 26    Mongolia 20    Sweden  83 
Botswana 21    Guinea-Bissau 13    Morocco 36    Switzerland  59 
Brazil 49    Guyana 20    Mozambique 24    Syria  33 
Bulgaria 34    Haiti 17    Namibia 16    Taiwan  28 
Burkina Faso  18    Honduras 29    Nepal 18    Tajikistan  13 
Burma 34    Hong Kong  19    Netherlands 77    Tanzania  27 
Burundi 20    Hungary 66    New Zealand  48    Thailand  40 
Cambodia 27    Iceland 5    Nicaragua 28    Togo  27 
Cameroon 29    India 50    Niger 19    Tunisia  34 
Canada 77    Indonesia  39    Nigeria 37    Turkey  57 
Central African Republic  20    Iran  41    North Korea  23    Turkmenistan  12 
Chad 21    Iraq  34    Norway 65    Uganda  27 
Chile 50    Ireland  81    Oman 21    Ukraine  24 
China 49    Israel  38    Pakistan 42    United  Arab  Emirates  24 
Colombia 45    Italy  75    Panama 27    United  Kingdom  94 
Costa Rica  26    Ivory Coast  31    Papua New Guinea  17    United States  80 
Croatia 20    Japan  59    Paraguay 27    Uruguay  44 
Cuba 40    Jordan  26    Peru 44    Uzbekistan  17 
Czech Republic  39    Kazakhstan  17    Philippines 40    Venezuela  41 
Czechoslovakia 36    Kenya  33    Poland 62    Vietnam 22 
Dem. Rep. of the Congo  35    Korea  18    Portugal 82    Yemen 21 
Denmark 84    Kuwait  25    Republic of the Congo  26    Yugoslavia 44 
Dominican Republic  19    Kyrgyzstan  14    Romania 39    Zambia 28 
East Germany  30    Laos  19    Russia 44    Zimbabwe 31 
Ecuador 41    Latvia  22    Rwanda 16      
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Table A2: Description of Technologies and their Coverage 
Category  Variable Description  Number of Countries  Country Coverage  Date Range 
Agriculture  Fertilizer consumed, total  149  all  1965 - 2005 
  Harvesters  116  all  1965 - 2005 
  Irrigated area  144  all  1965 - 2005 
  Milking machines  53  all  1965 - 2005 
  Percent of cultivated land using modern variety crops  85  developing  1960 - 2000 
  Percent of irigated land out of cultivated land  148  all  1965 - 2005 
  Pesticide consumed, total  120  all  1990 - 2000 
  Tractors  149  all  1965 - 2005 
Financial  ATMs  33  mostly OECD  1990 - 2005 
  Cheques issued  39  mostly OECD  1990 - 2005 
  Debit and credit card transactions  37  mostly OECD  1990 - 2005 
  Electronic funds transfers  34  mostly OECD  1990 - 2005 
  Points of service for debit/credit cards  35  mostly OECD  1990 - 2005 
General  Electricity production  149  all  1895 - 2005 
  Internet users  146  all  1990 - 2005 
  Personal computers  129  all  1980 - 2005 
Health  Appendectomies  19  OECD  1990 - 2005 
  Beds: in-patient acute care  26  OECD  1960 - 2005 
  Beds: in-patient long-term care  20  OECD  1960 - 2005 
  Beds: total hospital  145  all  1960 - 2005 
  Bone marrow transplants  25  OECD  1975 - 2005 
  Breast conservation surgeries  13  OECD  1995 - 2005 
  Caesarean sections  19  OECD  1990 - 2005 
  Cardiac catheterisations  17  OECD  1990 - 2005 
  Cataract surgeries  17  OECD  1980 - 2005 
  Cholecystectomies  16  OECD  1980 - 2005 
  Cholecystectomies, laparoscopic   10  OECD  1995 - 2005 
  Computed tomography (CAT) scanners  27  OECD  1980 - 2005 
  Coronary bypass procedures, in-patient  20  OECD  1980 - 2005 
  Coronary bypasses  23  OECD  1990 - 2005 
 
Coronary interventions, percutaneous (PTCA and 
stenting)  24  OECD  1990 - 2005 
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Table A2 (continued): Description of Technologies and their Coverage 
Category  Variable Description  Number of Countries  Country Coverage  Date Range 
Health (ctd.)  Coronary stenting procedures  10  OECD  1995 - 2005 
  Dialysis patients  27  OECD  1970 - 2005 
  Dialysis patients, home  24  OECD  1970 - 2005 
  Heart transplants  25  OECD  1980 - 2005 
  Hernia procedures, inguinal and femoral  17  OECD  1980 - 2005 
  Hip replacement surgeries  20  OECD  1990 - 2005 
  Hysterectomies (vaginal only)  20  OECD  1990 - 2005 
  Kidney transplants  27  OECD  1965 - 2005 
  Kidney transplants, functioning  25  OECD  1970 - 2005 
  Knee replacement surgeries  15  OECD  1990 - 2005 
  Lithotriptors  23  OECD  1985 - 2005 
  Liver transplants  27  OECD  1980 - 2005 
  Lung transplants  22  OECD  1985 - 2005 
  Mammographs  15  OECD  1970 - 2005 
  Mastectomies  18  OECD  1990 - 2005 
  MRI units  26  OECD  1985 - 2005 
  Pacemaker surgical procedures  11  OECD  1990 - 2005 
 
Percent immunized for DPT, children 12-23 
months  153  all  1980 - 2005 
 
Percent immunized for measles, children 12-23 
months  153  all  1980 - 2005 
  Percent of beds for acute care  21  OECD  1960 - 2005 
  Percent of cataract surgeries done as day cases  14  OECD  1990 - 2005 
 
Percent of cholecystectomies (laparoscopic) 
done as day cases  9  OECD  1995 - 2005 
  Percent of cholecystectomies done as day cases  11  OECD  1995 - 2005 
  Percent of dialysis patients at home  25  OECD  1970 - 2005 
 
Percent of hernia procedures (inguinal and 
femoral) done as day cases  14  OECD  1995 - 2005 
  Percent of renal failure patients, end stage  28  OECD  1970 - 2005 
  Percent of tonsillectomies done as day cases  12  OECD  1995 - 2005 
 
Percent of varicose veins procedures done as day 
cases  14  OECD  1995 - 2005 
  Prostatectomies (excluding transurethral)  14  OECD  1990 - 2005 
 
Prostatectomies (transurethral)  17  OECD  1990 - 2005 
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Table A2 (continued): Description of Technologies and their Coverage 
Category Variable Description  Number of 
Countries 
Country 
Coverage  Date Range 
Health (ctd.)  Radiation therapy equipment  24  OECD  1960 - 2005 
  Renal failure patients, end stage  25  OECD  1970 - 2005 
  Tonsillectomies  13  OECD  1980 - 2005 
  Varicose vein procedures  12  OECD  1995 - 2005 
Steel  Percent of steel production by other methods  23  all  1930 - 2005 
  Percent of steel production by the acid bessemer method  11  all  1930 - 1975 
 
Percent of steel production by the basic bessemer 
method  9  all  1930 - 1980 
  Percent of steel production in BOFs  58  all  1960 - 2005 
  Percent of steel production in EAFs  95  all  1930 - 2005 
  Percent of steel production in OHFs  53  all  1930 - 2005 
  Percent of steel production that is stainless  24  all  1985 - 1990 
  Stainless steel production  24  all  1985 - 1990 
  Steel production by other methods  23  all  1930 - 2005 
  Steel production by the acid bessemer method  11  all  1930 - 1975 
  Steel production by the basic bessemer method  8  all  1930 - 1980 
  Steel production in blast oxygen furnaces  56  all  1960 - 2005 
  Steel production in electric arc furnaces  93  all  1930 - 2005 
  Steel production in open hearth furnances  51  all  1930 - 2005 
Telecommunications  Cable television subscribers  95  all  1975 - 2005 
 Cell  phones  146  all  1980 - 2005 
  Mail items  79  all  1830 - 1995 
  Newspaper circulation (daily)  153  all  1950 - 2000 
  Radios  149  all  1925 - 2000 
  Telegrams  78  all  1850 - 1995 
  Telephones  152  all  1880 - 2005 
  TVs  152  all  1950 - 2005 
Textiles  Automatic looms  96  all  1965 - 1980 
  Percent of automatic textile looms  98  all  1965 - 1980 
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Table A2 (continued): Description of Technologies and their Coverage 
Category Variable Description  Number of 
Countries 
Country 
Coverage  Date Range 
Textiles (ctd.)  Percent of spindles that are ring spindles  31  all  1905 - 1955 
  Percent of textile raw materials that are unnatural  79  all  1965 - 1980 
  Spindles: mule  31  all  1905 - 1955 
  Spindles: ring  52  all  1905 - 1955 
Tourism  Hotel and other visitor beds  144  all  1980 - 2005 
  Hotel and other visitor rooms  145  all  1980 - 2005 
Transportation  Aviation passenger kilometers  109  all  1920 - 1995 
  Aviation ton-km of cargo  103  all  1930 - 1995 
  Percent of ships that are steam and motor  71  all  1790 - 1995 
  Percent of the tonnage of ships that are steam and motor  71  all  1790 - 1995 
  Railroads: freight ton-kilometers  100  all  1850 - 1995 
  Railroads: freight tons  116  all  1850 - 1995 
  Railroads: length of line open  126  all  1830 - 1995 
  Railroads: passenger journeys  112  all  1835 - 1995 
  Railroads: passenger-journey kilometers  94  all  1840 - 1995 
  Ships: motor  8  all  1910 - 1995 
  Ships: sail  31  all  1820 - 1995 
  Ships: steam  20  all  1820 - 1995 
  Ships: steam and motor  57  all  1870 - 1995 
  Ships: total  13  all  1830 - 1995 
  Tonnage of motor ships  8  all  1910 - 1995 
  Tonnage of sail ships  32  all  1790 - 1995 
  Tonnage of steam and motor ships  59  all  1870 - 1995 
  Tonnage of steam ships  21  all  1810 - 1995 
  Tonnage of total ships  13  all  1830 - 1995 
  Vehicles: commercial  121  all  1905 - 1995 
  Vehicles: passenger cars  149  all  1895 - 2005 
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Table A3: Annual speed of β Convergence by Variable  









Beds: in-patient acute care  pre-1500  0.035    Ships: steam  1788  -0.002 
Beds: in-patient long-term care  pre-1500  0.011    Ships: steam and motor  1788  0.002 
Beds: total hospital  pre-1500  0.082    Tonnage of steam and motor ships  1788  0.020 
Breast conservation surgeries  pre-1500  0.022    Tonnage of steam ships  1788  0.001 
Caesarean sections  pre-1500  0.030    Automatic looms  1801  0.001 
Cheques issued  pre-1500  0.059    Percent of automatic textile looms  1801  0.063 
Hernia procedures, inguinal and femoral  pre-1500  0.122    Fertilizer consumed, total  1815  0.004 
Hotel and other visitor beds  pre-1500  0.011    Railroads: freight ton-kilometers  1825  0.008 
Hotel and other visitor rooms  pre-1500  0.035    Railroads: freight tons  1825  -0.001 
Irrigated area  pre-1500  0.012    Railroads: length of line open  1825  0.004 
Mail items  pre-1500  0.020    Railroads: passenger journeys  1825  0.013 
Mastectomies pre-1500  -0.002    Railroads: passenger-journey kilometers  1825  -0.002 
Percent of beds for acute care  pre-1500  0.007    Percent of spindles that are ring spindles  1828  0.025 
Percent of hernia procedures done as day cases  pre-1500  0.009    Spindles: ring  1828  0.015 
Percent of irigated land out of cultivated land  pre-1500  -0.005    Telegrams 1835  0.001 
Percent of tonsillectomies done as day cases  pre-1500  0.001    Hysterectomies (vaginal only)  1843  0.028 
Percent of varicose veins procedures done as day cases  pre-1500  0.007    Harvesters 1850  0.008 
Ships: sail  pre-1500  0.020    Percent of steel production by the acid bessemer method  1855  0.276 
Ships: total  pre-1500  0.033    Percent of steel production by the basic bessemer method  1855  0.023 
Tonnage of sail ships  pre-1500  0.027    Percent of steel production in OHFs  1855  0.014 
Tonnage of total ships  pre-1500  0.009    Steel production by other methods  1855  0.040 
Tonsillectomies pre-1500  0.023    Steel production by the acid bessemer method  1855  0.080 
Varicose vein procedures pre-1500  0.033    Steel production by the basic bessemer method  1855  0.082 
Newspaper circulation (daily)  1606  0.041    Steel production in open hearth furnances  1867  0.025 
Cataract surgeries  1748  0.072    Tractors 1868  0.007 
Percent of cataract surgeries done as day cases  1748  0.039    Milking machines  1870  0.006 
Percent of ships that are steam and motor  1788  0.004    Telephones 1876  0.041 
Percent of the tonnage of ships that are steam and motor  1788  0.007    Cholecystectomies 1882  0.002 
Note: Speed of convergence estimated using equation (4) or (5). - 42 - 
Table A3 (continued): Annual speed of β Convergence by Variable 









Electricity production  1882  0.010    Percent of dialysis patients at home  1943  0.021 
Percent of cholecystectomies done as day cases  1882  -0.145    Percent of renal failure patients, end stage  1943  0.063 
Prostatectomies (excluding transurethral) 1883  0.024    Cell phones  1947  0.033 
Percent of textile raw materials that are unnatural  1884  0.073    Cable television subscribers  1949  0.015 
Appendectomies 1885  0.037    Debit and credit card transactions  1950  -0.002 
Vehicles: commercial  1885  0.024    Percent of steel production in BOFs  1950  0.061 
Vehicles: passenger cars  1885  0.055    Points of service for debit/credit cards  1950  0.148 
Ships: motor  1897  0.024    Steel production in blast oxygen furnaces  1950  -0.027 
Tonnage of motor ships  1897  0.039    Kidney transplants, functioning  1951  0.115 
Percent of steel production in EAFs  1900  0.015    Kidney transplants  1951  0.229 
Radiation therapy equipment  1900  0.083    Pacemaker surgical procedures  1952  0.028 
Steel production in electric arc furnaces  1900  0.048    Coronary bypasses  1953  0.036 
Cholecystectomies, laparoscopic   1901  0.039    Coronary bypass procedures, in-patient  1953  0.033 
Percent of cholecystectomies done as day cases  1901  -0.133    Bone marrow transplants  1956  0.043 
Radios 1901  0.004    Lung transplants  1963  0.118 
Aviation passenger kilometers  1903  0.047    Percent immunized for measles, children 12-23 months  1964  0.119 
Aviation ton-km of cargo  1903  0.033    Mammographs 1966  0.104 
Percent of steel production that is stainless  1913  -0.005    ATMs 1967  0.148 
Stainless steel production  1913  0.022    Heart transplants  1967  0.093 
TVs 1924  0.009    Liver transplants  1967  0.112 
Percent immunized for DPT, children 12-23 months  1927  0.086    Knee replacement surgeries  1970  0.016 
Prostatectomies (transurethral)  1931  0.051    Computed tomography (CAT) scanners  1972  0.037 
Hip replacement surgeries  1938  0.025    Internet users  1973  0.078 
Pesticide consumed, total  1939  0.164    Personal computers  1973  0.082 
Cardiac catheterisations  1941  0.044    Electronic funds transfers  1979  0.020 
Dialysis patients  1943  0.065    Coronary stenting procedures  1980  0.059 
Renal failure patients, end stage  1943  0.060    Lithotriptors 1980  0.020 
Dialysis patients, home  1943  0.069    MRI units  1981  0.054 
Note: Speed of convergence estimated using equation (4) or (5). 
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Figure 22: Evolution of median speed of convergence for technologies according to country coverage. 